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Political Apologies and
the Question of a
‘Shared Time’ in the
Australian Context
Michelle Bastian
University of Edinburgh, UK
Abstract
Although conceptually distinct, ‘time’ and ‘community’ are multiply intertwined
within a myriad of key debates in both the social sciences and the humanities.
Even so, the role of conceptions of time in social practices of inclusion and exclusion
has yet to achieve the prominence of other key analytical categories such as identity
and space. This article seeks to contribute to the development of this field by high-
lighting the importance of thinking time and community together through the lens of
political apologies. Often ostensibly offered in order to re-articulate both the con-
stitution of ‘the community’ and its future direction, official apologies are prime
examples of deliberate attempts to intervene in shared understandings of political
community and its temporality. Offering a detailed case study of one of these apolo-
gies, I will focus on Australian debates over the removal of indigenous children from
their families, known as the Stolen Generations, and examine the temporal dimen-
sions of the different responses offered by former prime ministers John Howard and
Kevin Rudd.
Keywords
Australia, community, national identities, political philosophy, racism, time
Arguably a central task of many humanities and social science disciplines
has been the analysis and critique of methods of social inclusion and
exclusion. Responding to this task has led to the rise of a multitude of
approaches developed within post-colonial theory, feminist theory, queer
theory, critical race theory and political theory, as well as work in human
geography – which has sought to strengthen, extend or transform these
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approaches through an explicit analysis of spatiality. One consequence of
this work is that core metaphysical questions around identity, causation,
free will and space, which have often been seen as the domain of an
abstracted elite, have become essential analytical categories in our under-
standings of social and cultural life. Challenging the way these concepts
have primarily been thought within Western metaphysics of presence, it
is now widely accepted that identity, social change, agency and spatiality
need to be understood as partial, relational, situated, hybrid and non-
teleological. Rather than being purely logical categories, these core con-
cepts have been shown to be shaped by politics, context and tradition.
Remaking social relations along less exclusionary lines thus requires that
we challenge the supposed neutrality of these concepts and instead show
how they are mobilized in varying ways in the construction of ‘insiders’
and ‘outsiders’.
There is, of course, one further key metaphysical concept – time – and
in this case it is not clear that understandings of time as a neutral medium
for social life have been eﬀectively challenged. On the one hand, there is a
wide range of work that argues that our ways of conceptualizing and
experiencing time are culturally and politically shaped. As Nancy
Munn’s classic essay on time in cultural anthropology neatly sets out,
‘the diﬀuse, endlessly multiplying studies of socio-cultural time reﬂect
time’s pervasiveness as an inescapable dimension of all aspects of
social experience and practice’ (1992: 93). Further, texts such as John
Hassard’s Sociology of Time (1990) and Alfred Gell’s Anthropology of
Time (1992) clearly situate time as a key problem within each discipline.
On the other hand, Munn notes that despite the availability of such texts
there is relatively little work that attempts a comprehensive analysis of
the socio-cultural production of time. Similar concerns have been
expressed across a range of areas, including, most notably, in Barbara
Adam’s work (1995), but also more recently in relation to health
(Strazdins et al., 2011), social activism (Panelli and Larner, 2010) and
environmental injustice (Auyero and Swistun, 2009), to name but a few
examples. That is, even while the importance of the temporal dimension
is recognized, the continued claim from across a range of social science
and humanities disciplines – that time is a missing element of analysis –
suggests that it has yet to develop the same kind of analytical purchase as
other reworked metaphysical concepts such as identity and space.
Even so, in relation to the particular interest of this paper around
mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion, one might be tempted to
point towards the vast literatures on history, genealogy, memory and
trauma as evidence of the widespread attention to the temporal dimen-
sions of belonging (e.g. Halbwachs, 1992; Caruth, 1996; Antze, 1996;
Foucault, 1990). Indeed it is clear that such literatures have contributed
enormously to a shift away from the idealization of static, homogeneous
communities, towards an understanding of belonging as dynamic,
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non-linear and as drawing on multiple histories. However, here we must
be careful not to conﬂate these approaches with an attention to time per
se. Within the discipline of history, for example, there has been a range of
calls to distinguish history from time in order to more fully understand
the kinds of conceptual imperatives driving various ways of writing and
doing history (Hall, 1980, see also Aminzade, 1992; Jensen, 1997; Gallois,
2007; Cladis, 2009; Ermarth, 2010). The concern is that without explicit
attention to the way time itself is thought, unexamined assumptions, for
example regarding time’s linearity, neutrality or all-encompassing char-
acter, may implicitly shape these analyses in problematic ways. Thus,
despite the usefulness of this work for thinking through many of the
temporal aspects of community, the political nature of the conceptual-
ization of time itself still needs to be more thoroughly foregrounded.
In order to respond to this issue, I want to focus on a detailed case
study that will allow me to illustrate the distinctiveness of an explicitly
time-focused approach, while also drawing out some of the speciﬁc ways
concepts of time are utilized in political debates about the make-up of a
community. This case study will analyze the diﬀering prime ministerial
responses to Australian debates around the oﬀering of an oﬃcial apology
to indigenous Australians for the removal of children from their families,
known as the Stolen Generations. Focusing particularly on their under-
standings of continuity, discontinuity and simultaneity within and across
moments of time, I will explore how traditional Western philosophies of
time continue to problematically shape understandings of who can
belong to the political community and in what ways. Aspects of this
have already had some prominence within debates about nationalism,
for example, including the centrality of the development of imagined
experiences of simultaneity within particular spatial borders (e.g.
Anderson, 1991), which is often held in tension with an awareness of
the structural impossibility of attaining such an experience (e.g. Bhabha,
1990). However, while I will contribute to discussions around issues of
simultaneity and synchronicity, I also want to pick up on a thread in the
debates around national apologies that has centred on the diﬀerent
eﬀects of conceptualizing time as either continuous or discontinuous
on the national community.
More generally, political apologies are particularly promising analyt-
ical sites for examining oﬃcial attempts to redeﬁne, restore or extend
popular accounts of who constitutes the political community and how
they do so (e.g. Edwards, 2010; Schaap, 2007: 9; Bhandar, 2007: 106).
Often ostensibly oﬀered in order to re-articulate both the constitution of
‘the community’ and its future direction, oﬃcial apologies are prime
examples of attempts to intervene into shared understandings of political
community and its temporality. Further, the Australian context provides
a compelling place to stage my analysis for a number of reasons. First,
there is a great deal of public awareness in the country around the role of
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history in the construction of political community. Centred in particular
around what has come to be known as the History Wars (Macintyre and
Clark, 2004; see also Reynolds, 1999), there has been widespread discus-
sion over the division between ‘positive’ accounts of national heroism
and determination versus ‘negative’ histories of settlers’ complicity with
dispossession and racism. These debates have also framed understand-
ings of the apology and prime ministerial decisions over whether one
should be oﬀered or not (e.g. Attwood, 2005).
However, a second reason why this context is particularly compelling
is the centrality of time itself to articulations of the relationship between
indigenous and non-indigenous Australians (Lloyd, 2000), as well as
within the non-indigenous settler population (Gunew, 1997). Here a var-
iety of techniques have been used to deny coevalness (to deny a common
occupation of time) as a central part of maintaining social inclusions and
exclusions (Fabian, 1983). So while the deeply politicized character of
national history has become more generally accepted, and is clearly
addressed in diﬀerent ways by leading political ﬁgures, what I will sug-
gest is that the way time itself is politicized has not been made explicit. As
a result, forms of exclusion supported by particular accounts of time are
not adequately addressed.
Initially this paper will contrast the diﬀerent responses between two
former Australian prime ministers: John Howard, who notably refused
to make an apology to the Stolen Generations on behalf of the
Australian government, and the subsequent prime minister, Kevin
Rudd, who made the apology as his ﬁrst act of parliament. I will suggest
that Rudd’s apology sought to create a more inclusive sense of national
community, one that supports a wider sense of responsibility and of how
the nation is constituted, in part through challenging Howard’s implicit
philosophy of time. While for Howard, the past was something to be left
behind, Rudd emphasized the interconnections between past and present
and in so doing extended the range of experiences that were pertinent to
the present. However, this article is motivated by the concern that despite
the manifest diﬀerences between the two, there are actually signiﬁcant
similarities in the broader temporal logic utilized by each, which suggests
that they both remain within the same problematic temporal framework.
As a result, I will argue that neither is able to adequately respond to the
complexities of a multicultural, settler society. Instead I will show how
concepts of time ﬁrst articulated by Aristotle and Newton continue to be
used problematically to explain and manage social life. Throughout I will
be particularly interested in the seeming potential of a uniﬁed time for
supporting a more inclusive community, which arises in certain litera-
tures on political apologies. Although I will challenge this approach, I
will conclude by looking more closely at the notion of ‘sharing time’
which underlies this response and will suggest three key issues for think-
ing through a more complex notion of coevalness.
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The Timing of an Apology
In examining the new-found prominence of the public apology in polit-
ical life, a number of theorists have sought to explicitly attend to the
variable conceptions of time that come into play. Jean-Marc Coicaud, for
example, in his examination of the reasons why political actors either do
or do not oﬀer an apology, argues that a key diﬀerentiating factor is how
the past is understood to be related to the present. He suggests that those
seeking to eschew responsibility for past wrongs emphasize the elusive
and discontinuous aspects of time while, on the other hand, ‘the idea
that apology is possible and needed rests both upon the assumption that
we can know what has happened and that this matters’ (Coicaud, 2009:
99–100).
For Coicaud, then, the shift towards oﬀering an apology rests on an
understanding of the past and present as connected, ‘in the sense that the
past continues in and has a bearing on the present’ (2009: 100). Most
importantly, he directly ties the act of apology to a speciﬁc conceptual-
ization of time, claiming that the apology depends upon ‘a uniﬁed con-
ception of time’ (2009: 100, emphasis added). Although there are a variety
of currents in analyses around political apologies, the need for a uniﬁed
time echoes through them. Adam Czarnota, for example, has argued that
a reconciliation between diﬀerent conceptions of time is perhaps ‘a neces-
sary precondition to political and social reconciliation in the contempor-
ary complex world’ (2007: 150). He thus suggests the need to think
through ‘the ethical value of synchronisation’ (2007: 160, emphasis in
the original).
For Andrew Schaap, it is important to maintain a critical relationship
to the notion of reconciliation, since it problematically presumes a state
of conciliation in the past to which the reconciled society would return.
He does not, therefore, suggest that the past can be understood as a site
of connection or unity. Nevertheless, he argues that reconciliation con-
tinues to be a useful concept insofar as it shifts toward positing a ‘coun-
terfactual we’ that anticipates a unity that is ‘not yet’ (Schaap, 2007: 9;
2006: 629). That is, while Schaap notes that the past is rarely character-
ized by experiences of social unity, an important driver for the reconcili-
ation process is the hope that the future might be. As I suggested above,
the question of whether a more inclusive political community does in fact
require a uniﬁed time, whether real or aspirational, is central to this
paper.1 To begin, however, I ﬁrst want to explore how the shifts between
a discontinuous and a continuous time, identiﬁed by Coicaud, have
operated in the Australian context.
On 13 February 2008, a formal apology was oﬀered by the then-Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd to Australia’s indigenous peoples for the forced
removal of Aboriginal children from their families from 1910 into the
1970s. It had been a long time coming. Over ten years earlier, the
98 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)
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previous government, led by John Howard, had received the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission’s report, Bringing Them
Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families (HREOC, 1997).
A key recommendation was for the government to formally recognize its
role in these separations, in part by oﬀering an oﬃcial apology. Howard,
however, had refused to do so. In many ways Howard’s justiﬁcations for
why he did not believe it to be appropriate, or necessary, to oﬀer an
apology lines up directly with Coicaud’s analysis. Coicaud identiﬁes
two main strategies used to deny the links between the past and present
and thus to justify a refusal to apologize. Although related to questions
of historicity, both clearly rest on a particular philosophy of time. First is
the strategy of claiming that ‘reality and its temporal character leave us
unclear about what has happened and what has not happened’ (Coicaud,
2009: 99). The second strategy Coicaud identiﬁes is the argument that
‘assuming that we can sort out facts from ﬁction as they unfold in time,
the existing separation between the stages of time makes all this quite
irrelevant’ (2009: 99).
Arguably the second strategy did the most work for Howard. For
example, he claimed that it was anachronistic to judge those who sanc-
tioned and carried out the removals in the past according to present
values since, according to him, at the time of their occurrence the
removals would have seemed justiﬁed. The assumption of a break
between the past and present also underpinned his stance of refusing
intergenerational responsibility. His clearest statement of this position
was at the 1997 Australian Reconciliation Convention where he claimed
that ‘Australians of this generation should not be required to accept guilt
and blame for past actions and policies over which they had no control’
(1997: n.p.). Finally, he refuted the ability of an apology in the present to
address trauma arising from the past, suggesting that responding in such
a way would merely be a ‘symbolic gesture’ (1997: n.p.). The alternative
response he advocated was to develop ‘practical programmes’ that left
the past behind and focused on what was possible for the future (1997:
n.p.). What each of these responses suggests is that, as John Frow argues,
Howard held to ‘a historical relativism which seals past and present in
their separate and internally homogeneous temporalities’ (2001: 83).
Underlying Howard’s response, then, was an implicit philosophy of
time that assumed a fundamental hiatus between past and present.
Indeed Howard appeared to believe that the settler population was
able to separate from its past, without the need for apology, simply
due to the discontinuous nature of time itself.
In contrast, an analysis of Rudd’s apology shows that, just as Coicaud
suggests, he in fact drew on an alternative philosophy of time, one in
which the past is continuous with the present. This can be seen particu-
larly in a number of statements where Rudd deliberately sought to draw
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the events of the Stolen Generations into the continuous story of the
Australian political community. Directly challenging Howard’s denial
of intergenerational responsibility, he claimed that ‘as has been said of
settler societies elsewhere, we are the bearers of many blessings from our
ancestors, and therefore we must also be the bearer of their burdens as
well’ (Rudd, 2008: n.p.). From this perspective, rather than being discon-
tinuous with the present, the acts of removal become an integral part of
the story of how ‘we’ arrived in the present.
Even further, Rudd directly contradicted the claim that the forced
removals of indigenous children occurred in a remote and unknowable
past, pointing out that removals continued into the 1970s. As Rudd
argued in his apology speech: ‘The 1970s is not exactly a point in remote
antiquity. There are still serving members of this parliament who were ﬁrst
elected to this place in the early 1970s. It is well within the adult memory
span of many of us’ (Rudd, 2008: n.p.). This argument challenged the logic
of Howard’s denial of intergenerational responsibility, which rested on an
implausible account of discrete rather than overlapping ‘generations’, and
thus further challenged his underlying philosophy of a discontinuous time.
In making the apology, then, Rudd did indeed appear to be setting out an
account of temporality as continuous, a temporality in which Indigenous
experiences are understood as coeval with the temporality of the nation-
state, rather than divided from it.
Importantly, given my speciﬁc interest in the broader relation of time
to conceptualizations of community and belonging, there is much in
Rudd’s speech to suggest that his attempt to draw upon a diﬀerent phil-
osophy of time (even if only implicitly) not only provided legitimacy to
the apology itself, as Coicaud suggested, but also resonated with
Czarnota’s concern with reconciling time itself. That is, Rudd’s eﬀort
to rearticulate time also arguably addressed concerns he had about the
political community more generally. For Rudd, the previous govern-
ment’s failure to act had produced a dislocation, one that divided the
time of the nation itself, and thus also divided the community. Recalling
the failure to respond to the Bringing Them Home report in a timely way,
he noted that ‘from the nation’s parliament there has been a stony and
stubborn and deafening silence for more than a decade’ (Rudd, 2008:
n.p.). According to Rudd, however, until settler Australians fully
respond to the injunction to acknowledge and take responsibility for
the removals, ‘until we fully confront that truth, there will always be a
shadow hanging over us and our future as a fully united and fully recon-
ciled people’ (2008: n.p.). Thus, in highlighting this lapse, Rudd not only
emphasized the previous government’s failure to respond to this ethical
injunction in a timely manner but appeared to be suggesting that, due to
this failure, the proper ﬂow of time had been halted or arrested and, as a
result, the community was out of joint.
100 Theory, Culture & Society 30(5)
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One of Rudd’s hoped for outcomes of the apology, therefore, was a
‘reconciliation across the entire history of the often bloody encounter
between those who emerged from the Dreamtime a thousand generations
ago and those who, like me, came across the seas only yesterday’ (Rudd,
2008: n.p.). This quote is interesting for a number of reasons. First, in
tracing Australia’s origins back to two diﬀerent points, he utilized an
understanding of the nation as being produced through multiple trajec-
tories, suggesting a more complex understanding of the past, while also
challenging notions of a timeless nation (Connor, 2004). Second, even
while recognizing this diversity he ultimately suggested that the act of
apology had the potential to bring this multiple and disjunctive past into
a kind of concordance. Czarnota’s emphasis on the need to reconcile the
complexities of social time itself is thus evident in Rudd’s own approach.
In particular he called upon Australians to come together as follows:
Let us turn this page together: Indigenous and non-Indigenous
Australians, government and opposition, Commonwealth and
State, and write this new chapter in our nation’s story together.
First Australians [indigenous peoples], First Fleeters [colonial set-
tlers], and those who ﬁrst took the oath of allegiance just a few
weeks ago [recent migrants] — let’s grasp this opportunity to
craft a new future for this great land, Australia. (Rudd, 2008: n.p.)
Rudd’s apology did not, therefore, only articulate an alternative tem-
poral relationality in order to transform the nation’s sense of responsi-
bility for the past, he also sought to encourage a new sense of coevalness
within which Australians could begin to occupy the same shared ﬂow of
time, thus realigning the community itself.
A Doubled Temporal Logic
In relation to the apology, then, both Rudd and Howard supported
Coicaud’s thesis that the act of apology, and the refusal to apologize,
are rooted in diﬀerent philosophies of time. For Howard, a discontinu-
ous time supported his eﬀorts to delegitimize indigenous calls for a
response from the state, while, for Rudd, a continuous time helped to
legitimate his decision to make such a response. In as much as debates
around political apologies feed into questions about political community
more generally, what the above appears to suggest is that when thinking
through the relation between time and community, and particularly the
question of the time of an inclusive community, an understanding of time
as continuous is essential. However, in this section, I want to develop a
more detailed picture of the implicit philosophies of time used by
Howard and Rudd. This is because even while they may sit on opposite
sides of the ‘History Wars’ debate – in that Howard actively championed
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a glorious history of achievement, while Rudd acknowledged the need to
address histories of dispossession and conﬂict – from a temporal perspec-
tive their approaches are not as distinct as they may ﬁrst appear.
First, even while holding to an account of time as discontinuous, in
relation to other members of the nation, Howard’s temporal logic was
quite diﬀerent in regard to Anglo-settler history. Far from claiming that
the past holds no relevance to the present, Howard in fact positioned it as
eternally relevant. A paradigmatic example of this can be seen in his
accounts of the continuing relevance of the First World War battle at
Gallipoli. Taking place in what is now Turkey, the military engagement
resulted in large casualties for the Australian and New Zealand Army
Core (or ANZAC). Since 1916 the battle has been commemorated on 25
April as Anzac Day in both Australia and New Zealand. Throughout the
’80s and early ’90s, attendance at Anzac Day events, particularly the
Dawn Service, had been waning, and during his tenure as prime minister
(1996–2007), Howard actively sought to reinvigorate the tradition. His
speeches at these services emphasize his belief in the continuing relevance
of Gallipoli for the contemporary Australian community. For example,
in an opinion piece on the intensiﬁcation of Australian nationalism, his-
torian Mark McKenna asks his readers to consider a range of quotes
from these speeches where Howard describes the Anzac tradition as: ‘a
creed to which we can all aspire’; ‘a great tradition which has shaped the
character and the destiny of this country more than any other tradition
or inﬂuence’; one that occupies ‘the eternal place in the Australian soul’
(Howard quoted in McKenna, 2007). As McKenna (2007) argues, the
language Howard utilizes ‘pines for tradition, yearns for the mystical,
searches for the transcendent moment’. In stark contrast to his approach
to the Reconciliation debates, then, Howard asserted that the past does
indeed have signiﬁcant meaning and continued impact on the present. In
speciﬁc contexts, therefore, Howard also held a conception of time where
the present is continuous with the past.
Similar to Rudd, Howard’s use of a continuous time also played an
important role in his attempts to shape the political community in par-
ticular ways. That is, even while the continuity he proposed in the above
example was in relation to the speciﬁc legacy of the ANZACs, he none-
theless held that it had the potential to be all-encompassing and, as noted
previously, to be a ‘creed to which we can all aspire’. Indeed at a cere-
mony in Gallipoli in 2000 he stated that ‘today we join the past with the
present; we conﬁrm that that Anzac tradition permeates our modern life
as it has permeated earlier generations’ (quoted in Ball, 2004: n.p.). Thus,
for Howard, as for Rudd, claiming continuity with the past was central
to his vision of a uniﬁed community.
Far from being inclusive, however, this particular assertion of tem-
poral continuity works to support multiple exclusions. As cultural the-
orist Martin Ball notes, in the story of Gallipoli, ‘the Aboriginal
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population is conveniently absent. The convict stain is wiped clean.
Postwar immigration is yet to broaden the cultural identity of the popu-
lation’ (2004: n.p.). Additionally, as Marilyn Lake (1992), among others,
has argued, women too are absent. Thus, the supposedly unifying creed
that traces an unbroken path through the Australian soul actually works
to dislocate multiple members of the community from the temporal tra-
jectory of the nation. Even as the stories of Gallipoli are made eternally
relevant, the Stolen Generations, being subject to the vagaries of time,
are put under an ontological erasure that renders their experiences imma-
nent, uncertain and thus, seemingly, irrelevant. As a result, Howard’s
claim that the present is continuous with the past is neither self-evident
nor neutral. Instead the choice of Gallipoli as the anchoring link
performs complex exclusionary work. This conﬁrms that in and of
itself using a conception of time as continuous need not be inclusive at
all.2 Further, when viewed more broadly, it becomes clear that the impli-
cit temporal philosophy guiding Howard’s political approach is not only
one that proposes a historical relativism, as Frow suggests, but is actually
characterized in terms of a doubled logic in which time can be either
continuous or divided, depending on the context.
Second, Rudd himself can also be seen to be utilizing a similar kind of
doubled temporal logic. Indeed this logic is discernible within the apol-
ogy itself – at the very point when continuity seems so indispensable. This
is because, alongside his aﬃrmation that the past is continuous with the
present, he also articulates a hope that the apology itself will produce a
division from the past for the sake of the future. That is, while the act of
oﬀering the apology rests on the recognition of the past as meaningful for
the present, one of the temporal paradoxes of apologies more generally is
that ideally they should also bring this past to a close (Arendt, 1998: 236–
43). Thus, at the heart of Rudd’s speech is the desire to create a division
between the discordant community haunted by its past and a reconciled
community ready to embrace its future. The contrast between these
experiences of community is supported by a contrast in experiences of
time. On the one side is an experience of disjunction and delay, while on
the other is the experience of wholeness and futurity. Located between
these two experiences is the apology. In oﬀering it, Rudd suggests that ‘if
the apology we extend today is accepted in the spirit of reconciliation in
which it is oﬀered, we can today resolve together that there be a new
beginning for Australia’ (Rudd, 2008: n.p.). The apology thus oﬀers the
possibility of realigning the disjunctive community of the past only inso-
far as it is accepted as a break in time, as a new beginning.
Rudd’s use of a conception of time as discontinuous is further evident
in the way he likens the past to a book, one with distinct pages and
chapters. For example, he claimed that ‘it is for the nation to bring the
ﬁrst two centuries of our settled history to a close, as we begin a new
chapter’. So while he recognizes the government’s responsibility for the
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continuing trauma aﬀecting indigenous Australians as a result of removal
policies, the apology, once oﬀered, appears to furnish an all-encompass-
ing release. In his eﬀort to realign the nation’s temporality and combat
what he sees as a dangerous dislocation created by the decade long
refusal to acknowledge responsibility, like Howard, Rudd also articulates
a need to put the past to rest. This shift happens quite swiftly in the
apology – for example, Rudd declares in quick succession: ‘it is time to
reconcile. It is time to recognise the injustices of the past. It is time to say
sorry. It is time to move forward together’ (Rudd, 2008: n.p.). In this way
the apology works as a kind of pivot, enabling a shift from disjointed
multiple pasts and origins to a past represented by a single book com-
prised of discrete sections. So even as Rudd oﬀers an account of the
nation’s past as not being traceable back to a single point of origin, he
overlays this account with the promise of a new point of origin from
which all Australians might set out together. In this way, the apology,
although requiring a sense of continuous time in order to appear as
legitimate, also works as a device for dividing time in order to separate
diﬀerent experiences of community from each other and so re-time the
nation.
So if Rudd shows similarities to Howard in terms of the underlying
temporal logics, his approach also furnishes further evidence that the
notion of a continuous time is not necessarily all-encompassing. The
apology oﬀered by Rudd was couched within an overarching framework
that situated the work of reconciliation between two groups: indigenous
and non-indigenous. While from a certain perspective this makes sense,
one result is that the complexity of the relations among non-indigenous
Australians drops out of the picture. Although there are a few allusions
to a diﬀerentiated settler population, these are notable for their almost
ahistorical character. For example, Rudd refers to ‘those like me who
came over the seas only yesterday’. This phrase aims to highlight the
length of indigenous presence within Australia, stretching for tens of
thousands of years, in contrast to the small fraction of time settler
Australians have occupied the land. As important as this aim is, Rudd
risks homogenizing the settler population in such a way that, ﬁrst, erases
a particular history of racism. In a 220 year history of non-indigenous
settlement, which includes the White Australia Policy3 and the Paciﬁc
Solution4, are all those coming across the oceans really ‘like me’ – like
Rudd?
Second, as Sneja Gunew argues, the question of who has the right to
be considered ‘in time’ with the nation has not only played out between
indigenous and settler Australians but also operates as a mode of exclu-
sion within the settler population itself. That is, ‘modernity’ is often
characteristic only of British Europeans, while non-Anglo Europeans
are paradoxically situated ‘as being outside European modernity and
part of a grouping of subaltern subjects who remain in need of
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enlightenment and civilization’ (Gunew, 2004: 34). Once again, an
account of time as continuous can be seen to work as a mode of exclu-
sion. The eﬀort to utilize a conception of time that might be more inclu-
sive and yet avoid homogenizing those to be ‘included’ would therefore
need to be better able to take these kinds of complexities into account.
There is thus an unexpected similarity between Rudd’s apology and
Howard’s refusal to apologize. That is, both use a doubled temporal
logic in which time can be either continuous or divided. Crucially,
both use this logic to divide social conﬂict from the present and locate
it in the past. Howard uses the device of ‘previous generations’, for
example, to conﬁne conﬂict around the removals to an inaccessible
past. Rudd, on the other hand, uses the apology itself and its capacity
to enable the political community to ‘turn the page’, to put the past
behind the nation so that it can now move conﬁdently towards the
future. Indeed Tony Barta, for one, has made strong criticisms of
Rudd’s characterization of the apology as a new beginning, even sug-
gesting that it ‘might be considered a victory for Howard’s “practical
reconciliation”’ (Barta, 2008: 210). Further, a closer analysis of each of
their uses of a continuous time raises questions about the ability of this
mode of time to resolve conﬂict within a complex and multi-faceted
society. What this suggests is that insofar as the temporal models that
feed into the logics of political life are left implicit, there can be a failure
to identify the sometimes unanticipated similarities between political
actors. But further, the question I am particularly interested in here is
whether a more explicit account of the role of time in social life might
open up alternative ways of thinking about the interrelations between
time and community, in the Australian context, but also more generally.
Making Time, Making Community
In seeking to draw out the variety of relations between time and com-
munity, a broader framework is therefore required. Crucial to the devel-
opment of such a framework is the observation, common in the social
sciences, that the time of social life is not singular but is experienced,
represented and conceptualized diﬀerently in diﬀerent contexts. That is,
treating time as an integral component of the political requires an under-
standing of it, not as an inﬂexible constraint, or as an inert medium, but
as socially and culturally variable (see Rutz, 1992: 2). Far from being
objective and quantitative, as I have already outlined above, the variabil-
ity of conceptions of time supports its mobilization in attempts to include
or exclude diﬀerent constituencies from the political community. From
this point of view, one of the key diﬃculties with the move towards either
a continuous or a synchronized social time, as part of addressing rela-
tions of inequality between social groups, is the incongruity of this claim
with a recognition of the fundamental inevitability of multiple times in
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social life. That is, if time is always diverse, might not the goal of unifying
time actually be allied with the same doomed political drive towards
homogenization that extols a uniﬁed culture, language and identity?
However, if this is the case, how are we to respond to questions about
time’s continuity or discontinuity, which were so crucial to the debates
outlined above? What I want to explore in this section, then, is whether a
closer analysis of traditional Western accounts of time might help to shed
light on this particular debate. But more broadly, I am interested in
exploring how the logics of a single uniﬁed, all-encompassing time
might support elisions between temporal notions such as continuity
and synchronicity on the one hand and political claims for social inclu-
sivity and commensurability on the other. In so doing I will provide a
broader outline of some of the ways time plays a role in the construction
of community and also address why it is that I have concerns about the
ability of a uniﬁed conception of time to address inequalities in the way
some theorists might hope.
First, then, is the question of the relationship between a continuous
and a discontinuous time. In the previous section, I suggested that
although it appeared that the temporal logics underlying the apology
consisted primarily of Rudd asserting a continuity between past and
present, which fundamentally challenged Howard’s assertion of a discon-
tinuity, things were actually not so clear. Instead, I painted a more
complicated picture that suggested that, although Rudd and Howard
might oﬀer diﬀerent accounts of history, Rudd in fact continued to utilize
a similar temporal logic to his predecessor. Helpfully, the question of
whether time is continuous or divided is one of the primary paradoxes of
time addressed by Aristotle in the Physics. While noting that time can
indeed be understood as continuous succession, he also notes that insofar
as the past is not the future, but is distinct and separate from it, then time
must also be divided (Aristotle, 1984). That is, according to common,
everyday understandings, Aristotle suggests that we actually understand
time as being both continuous and discontinuous. He locates the source
of this ambiguity in the diﬃculty of clearly deﬁning the character of the
now, or the present moment.
An analysis of the now shows that it is both that which links time
together (since it is what connects the past with the future) and also what
bounds or limits it (since the now marks the beginning of the future and
the end of the past) (see 222a: 10–12). The complexities of his account are
legion, but for my purposes here, his initial statement of the ambiguities
of time already provides an important perspective on the putative bene-
ﬁts of moving towards a uniﬁed time. Intriguingly, Aristotle’s analysis
suggests that debates over whether the past is continuous with the present
or divided from it are not, in fact, debates over two diﬀerent temporal
logics, but instead point to an ambiguity arising from the framework of
linear time itself. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this ambiguity suggests
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that asserting continuity as the solution to discontinuity is ineﬀective,
since one is not strictly the contradiction of the other. Instead, ‘connec-
tion’ and ‘disconnection’ are interdependent ambiguities inherent to the
conceptualization of linear time itself.5
If Aristotle’s account suggests that the hope of a uniﬁed linear time is
structurally impossible, there is still nonetheless the question of the
common-sense appeal of such a notion. That is, Howard and Rudd
both linked their ideal community to a social time that was itself idealized
as uniﬁed and homogeneous. For each prime minister, relations of con-
tinuity between the past and present were key to producing a shared, all-
encompassing present upon which the nation’s future could be based.
Whether this is a regrouping around the values championed in relation to
Gallipoli, or around a shared recognition of past wrongs, both proposed
a vision of a community uniﬁed through its recognition of particular
continuities between the past and present. Thus, even while I have sug-
gested that there can be no settling of the question of time’s continuity or
discontinuity, the notion that a single all-inclusive ﬂow of time is the
proper time of a cohesive community remains powerfully inﬂuential.
Of course thinking of time in this way is far from intuitive to everyone,
and there is a wide awareness that the sense of participating in a syn-
chronous time of the nation was partly the result of newly developed
media and transport infrastructures (e.g. Allen, 2008; Putnis, 2010).
Added to this industrial and material restructuring, however, have
been the shifts in conceptual frameworks that were prompted by the
gradual take-up of notions in classical physics, particularly Newtonian
time, within social life more generally (e.g. Bernet, 1982: 91). While this
account proved useful for particular problems in mathematics and phys-
ics, I would argue that despite its supersession by Einstein’s General
Theory of Relativity, there continues to be an uncritical transposition
of this framework into our understandings of social life which negatively
impacts on the options available to us for thinking through the possibi-
lities of community.
To put Newton’s account brieﬂy, like Aristotle, he understood time as
a sequence of nows. However, there is less ambiguity in his account in
that the emphasis is much more on conceptualizing time as continuous.
That is, for Newton (1993), time moves from the past toward the future
in a single all-encompassing ﬂow made up of non-repeatable moments.
All events can be placed along a single line of time, within which each
event is understood as being simultaneous with all other events that
occur in the ‘same’ moment. I would argue that this assertion of a par-
ticular kind of universal commensurability within the moment, and espe-
cially Newton’s oﬀering of a ‘natural’ scientiﬁc grounding for such a
notion, could be regarded as one of the key conceptual supports for
modern Western understandings of the ideal community. As I have dis-
cussed in other contexts, Newton’s conception of time arguably makes
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most sense within social life when it is utilized to manage logistical prob-
lems, such as those of transportation (see Bastian, 2011; Greenhouse,
1996). The ability to leave one’s house at 17 minutes past the hour in
order to catch a train to work at 33 past the hour, for example, requires a
certain faith in the notion that all those others whom I need to coordinate
myself with, including conductors, platform guards, train drivers and
indeed the train itself, are in the same time as me. That is, I need to
believe that their lives and movements are commensurable with my own,
in such a way that if we all ‘keep to time’ then everything will go like
‘clockwork’. While this faith is itself dependent on the reliability and
accuracy of the technological devices we use for social co-ordination
(see Landes, 2000: 139), it is also dependent on the assumption that
despite the many qualitative diﬀerences in each person’s life, the potential
for synchronization with others is ever-present. In logistical contexts the
assumption of potential synchrony is undoubtedly useful; however, it is
important to note that this kind of synchronization is enabled by
increased uniformity and homogeneity. That is, linear time works as a
device for bringing communities together in an orderly way insofar as it
allows us to minimize or ignore qualitative diﬀerences. While this may be
reasonable in the case of transport, as we have already seen, this promise
of an all-encompassing simultaneity is not only utilized in attempts to
solve logistical problems but political ones as well.
In order to draw out the implications of the promise of synchrony
within social life, and the political in particular, I want to introduce
anthropologist Carol Greenhouse’s approach to social time, which sug-
gests a number of reasons why we should be cautious about utilizing a
notion of an all-encompassing synchronized present when responding to
the complexities of social life. Of fundamental importance is her claim
that what is at the root of the way we use time in social life is not ‘nature
but rather social contest’ (Greenhouse, 1996: 4). Within a range of con-
tinental philosophy, for example, public time is described as arising
through the development of techniques to measure the natural world,
speciﬁcally the sun and other astronomical bodies (see, for example,
Heidegger, 1996: §80–81). For Greenhouse, as for many anthropologists
and sociologists, time is instead understood as a tool of social coordin-
ation that varies according to which ‘social’ is to be coordinated. Thus
when diﬀerent social worlds vie for dominance, part of the struggle is
inevitably over which ‘time’ will dominate. Indeed, I have suggested in
this paper that the apology itself could be seen as a key site of struggle
over how time is to be conceptualized.
Given the centrality of social contest, Greenhouse further argues that
understanding linear time as a simple fact of life, and therefore as sep-
arate to power, is ‘a mystiﬁcation essential to modern Western political
thought’ (Greenhouse, 1996: 86). We have already seen one example of
this in Howard’s claims that indigenous experiences were no longer
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relevant simply due to the passing of time. That is, from a Newtonian
perspective these experiences have no ontological status in the present
since they have ceased to be. Indeed, it would be illogical or anachronistic
to try to claim that such experiences had some kind of existence in the
present. What this suggests initially, then, is the need for a healthy sus-
picion of the seeming self-evidence of linear models of time, including
more nuanced accounts of synchrony or continuity, since time’s status as
‘natural’, ‘scientiﬁc’ or ‘real’ can be mobilized for political ends, making
particular hierarchies themselves appear as natural and thus inevitable.
As a result, understanding our use of time in social life to be driven,
ﬁrst, by conﬂict, rather than, say, a desire to measure intervals precisely,
leads Greenhouse to claim further that varying conceptions of time are
integral to attempts to legitimize a uniﬁed political authority over a
diverse group. That is, she argues, that ‘ruling or aspiring elites address,
in temporal terms, the political challenges from new forms of cultural
diversity among their constituents’ (Greenhouse, 1996: 8). Far from there
being a single homogeneous time guiding social life, Greenhouse instead
paints a picture of political actors competing over which time will win
out. Examples of this can be seen in a wide range of contexts. David
Gross, for example, has argued that ‘who or what stakes out and super-
intends the trans-individual temporal sense’ was a key battleground
between religious and secular authorities during the rise of the modern
Western state (Gross, 1985: 55). And E.P. Thompson has vividly outlined
the way broader conﬂicts around time between factory owners and work-
ers gradually narrowed to ﬁt within the overall construct of hourly-based
labour during the rise of industrialized capitalism (Thompson, 1967: 79–
86). Other more recent essays that suggest a similar link between conﬂict
and rearticulations of time include Neil Fleming’s (2010) claim that
media representations of a continuous and coherent line of time helped
support British colonial policies on the government of India. The link
between concepts of time and attempts to prove political legitimacy in
Israel has also been studied from a number of perspectives (e.g. Moshe,
2009; Golden, 2002). Finally, Shoshana Keller (2007) has analysed the
way political conﬂicts in Uzbekistan have been partly played out around
whether its national identity should be guided by a Eurasian Islamic
historical time or the European historical time envisioned by communist
writers. This suggests that when analysing the way time is used by those
seeking to mould a particular vision of the political community, it
becomes vitally important to understand that this takes place against a
backdrop of multiple competing times.
Consequently, the seemingly common-sense notion that there is, or
could be, an underlying unity or commensurability in regard to the tem-
porality of social life is far from the actual case. Instead Greenhouse
argues that formal time concepts such as linear time actually work to
hide the complex temporalities at work in a diverse society. That is,
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‘every temporal form suspends or rearranges the temporality of the
“other” or others; that is what formal representations of time are’
(Greenhouse, 1996: 85). So to return to the example of logistical times
already discussed above, prior to the coming of ‘railway time’ (and after-
wards Greenwich Mean Time), many UK cities and towns had their own
‘times’ told in reference to the position of the sun and calibrated to their
location (see Zerubavel, 1982). Bristol solar time, for example, is ten
minutes behind Greenwich Mean Time. In the shift to a ‘standard
time’ all these other times were suspended in favour of the country fol-
lowing GMT. Crucially, this ‘standard time’ was not neutral but was
actually ‘London time’, thus reinforcing, for the rest of the country,
the dominance of the capital. In this way, then, the imposition of a
single time can be seen to be ‘about’ managing the multiple times of
others in as much as it arises as a response to the perceived unwieldiness
of diverse local times by particular kinds of elites.
Importantly, as I suggested above, while utilizing a Newtonian notion
of an all-encompassing time may be useful in solving logistical problems
(though of course the shift to ‘standard time’ was not without conﬂict),
my concern is that it continues to act as a method for responding to
political conﬂicts as well. Thus I would argue that espousing a single time
as a solution to social conﬂict – far from creating a ‘shared time’ –
actually supports a reductive approach to the complexities of social
life, obscuring the varying, multiple and contradictory rhythms and tra-
jectories it is composed of. The temptation then becomes to idealize unity
and synchrony, and where conﬂicts are present, to assume that they are
ultimately commensurable within a properly aligned and shared time.
Most importantly, if Western accounts of linear time only ever ambigu-
ously support claims for either connection or disconnection, then claims
for continuity or discontinuity over time are never apolitical truth claims
but instead involve acts of selection and decisions regarding relevance.
Translate these possibilities to the social realm and we begin to see why
time is so important in situations of social conﬂict, as Greenhouse argues.
That is, conceptualizing time as being made up of nows (which both
produce connections and destroy them) provides a ﬂexible medium in
which to legitimate whichever connections or disconnections are pre-
ferred within social life, while also hiding the hierarchies folded into
this supposedly all-encompassing ﬂow by suggesting that this temporal
model is simply common sense.
Thus, while one might argue that the fact that Rudd and Howard used
the same temporal framework is not a crucial issue – after all, in reality
they acted in very diﬀerent ways (i.e. one apologized and one did not) –
there are larger issues that give cause for concern. Speciﬁcally, assuming
that time simply is a single all-encompassing ﬂow, not attending to the
broader set of values and assumptions it supports could end up under-
mining good-faith eﬀorts to rearticulate community in more inclusive
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ways. This is particularly the case in complex social situations such as
Rudd sought to intervene into. Indeed an uncritical assumption of com-
mensurability in the present moment could arguably be said to be what
was at the heart of his faith in the apology to oﬀer a new beginning for
the nation. This is because, despite the qualitative diﬀerences between all
those who make up a community, linear models lend a certain common-
sense believability to the claim that being together in the same moment
means that each social member is with all the others in some deeper sense.
I would argue that this is precisely the trap that Rudd falls into when he
announces a certain uniﬁcation of the Australian political community at
the moment of the apology, simply by virtue of everyone experiencing it
at the same time.
As Derrida argues in The Other Heading (1992), even within the press-
ing experience of an imminent crisis, one cannot simply take it for
granted that history, identity or culture can be aligned. Despite this,
Rudd characterizes the moment of the apology as a new point of uniﬁ-
cation from which Australians might all set oﬀ together in unison. Due to
the apology, the community becomes realigned, gets back in step, clocks
and watches set to the same time – as if by setting oﬀ again from the same
point we can’t help but arrive at the destination all together and without
fractures. So while it is not the case that all those who have recommended
a uniﬁed time as a guide for social life have done so in the same way or
even in a simplistic way, I would argue, nevertheless, that the promise of
commensurability it oﬀers has not been suﬃciently uncovered, analysed
and critiqued.
Sharing Time?
If responding to the challenges of envisioning an inclusive and diverse
political community are not adequately addressed through attempts to
produce a newly uniﬁed time, might there still not be other ways to think
through the desire to share time that underlies this particular response?
That is, even while I have raised concerns about a uniﬁed time, the
underlying motivation for this response, namely to contest the way par-
ticular concepts of time support certain social groups, while undermining
others, is one I share. In the ﬁnal section of this paper, then, I want to
explore the question of whether the impulse to share time must necessar-
ily be tied to a model that assumes an inclusive time is one that is all-
encompassing.
Challenging the denial of a shared time is at the heart of possibly the
most well-known account of the links between time and social inclusion
and exclusion. Anthropologist Johannes Fabian’s work calls for an end
to exclusionary techniques which temporally distance non-Western
others from the present, arguing instead for the need to view others as
coeval with the self, where coevalness describes ‘a common, active
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“occupation,” or sharing of time’ (1983: 31). Responding to his call is
important since, far from being merely a methodological problem arising
within certain anthropological methods, the denial of coevalness has, in
fact, become entrenched in ‘the cultural conventions of political self-
legitimation in modern nation-states’ (Greenhouse, 1996: 2). Even so,
Fabian’s notion of coevalness has come under attack for remaining
within a totalizing colonialist framework (e.g. Osuri, 2006).
Despite this, there is evidence to suggest that there are possibilities of
advancing the notion of coevalness in a more radical direction. Indeed
Fabian himself is careful to state that he is not suggesting that there
should be an attempt to unite everyone within the same social under-
standings and representations of time. In fact he acknowledges that this
would ‘indeed amount to a theory of appropriation’ (Fabian, 1983: 154).
Instead what I want to propose is that we come to understand the call to
share time as a call to recognize more clearly the way that a community’s
co-temporality is always multiple and never absolutely synchronous. To
recognize coevalness would then entail breaking the conceptual bond
that links ‘harmonious community’ with a ‘synchronized time’ in order
to instead develop notions of community that would admit the possibility
of being in diﬀerent times, at the same time.While the work of rethinking
community in such a way would require more space than I have available
here, I want to end my analysis with a discussion of three points that
I believe would be integral to such work.
The ﬁrst element of this approach would undoubtedly draw on the
body of work within continental philosophy that seeks to rethink com-
munity around a non-teleological model where the present is never pre-
sent to itself (as Rudd seemed to believe it to be), and where the future is
ultimately unforeseeable. This reconceptualized community is one that is
never fully self-enclosed but instead is dislocated by non-synchronous
elements, including the untimely, the out of joint, and the messianic
(see Derrida, 1994; Agamben, 1993; Blanchot, 2000; Nancy, 1991).
Crucial to this work is the eﬀort to aﬃrm the ethical value of a disjunct-
ive and de-synchronous time for the political. For Rudd, the disjunctive
time of the political community was primarily a problem to be rectiﬁed.
As a result, he failed to recognize that it was precisely the disjunctive
experience of community and time itself that made room for Anglo-
Australians to reassess their past and current actions and to acknowledge
the ways their privileges are produced through the suﬀering and dispos-
session of indigenous peoples. Instead he sought to move beyond the
disjointed and multiple time of the nation, dividing Anglo settlers from
their past just as this connection was oﬃcially recognized for the ﬁrst
time. A greater attentiveness to the untimeliness of the Australian com-
munity might have also enabled a better recognition of the further dis-
junctions between the histories and times of the settler population itself
and perhaps allowed Rudd to provide a foothold for other ways of
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thinking through responsibility in a context of multiple histories of
racism and exclusion (see Hage, 2001; Chakrabarty, 2001).
Sharing time in a community characterized by a radical suspicion of a
single, homogeneous time would instead mean that addressing responsi-
bility for past wrongs could not be satisﬁed by an apology made in a
single moment. As Alice MacLachlan has pointed out, an apology
cannot be pinpointed in such a way, since so much depends on what
actions are taken subsequently (MacLachlan, 2010: 380). Further, for
Derrida, a process of reconciliation that aims to re-establish normality
actually betrays the radical nature of forgiveness. Instead he argues that
‘forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative, normalizing. It
should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impos-
sible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of historical temporality’
(Derrida, 2001: 31–2). Far from setting the times to rights, then, Derrida
suggests that an apology worthy of the name would interrupt time. This
could not be a clean division, but rather an interruption that meant that
the dominant culture could not carry on as it had before.
In this case, then, a recognition of the untimely would enable a greater
awareness of the fact that the rush to turn the page, to move forward, to
set a new agenda, potentially leaves very little room for an apology itself
to do any work. Writing before Rudd’s apology, Rosalyn Diprose also
argued that a truly ‘open apology’ would be marked by interruption,
suggesting that for the Australian political community ‘to be unsettled,
for the future to contradict the past, indigenous testimonies must aﬀect
the fabric of dominant culture’ (Diprose, 2002: 158–9). Like Derrida she
argues that such an unsettling could not occur through the oﬀering of an
apology that aimed only towards regaining self-control, discharging a
debt or annulling one’s guilt (Diprose, 2001: 131).
The advocacy of interruption can also be seen in Sara Ahmed’s work
where she argues that while the tendency to try to shift quickly from an
acknowledgement of racism to a call for action ‘is understandable and
complicated’, it can nevertheless ‘work to block hearing’ (Ahmed, 2004:
§56). This is because ‘in moving on from the present towards the future, it
can also move away from the object of critique, or place the white subject
“outside” that critique in the present of the hearing’ (2004: §56). Instead
it is important that ‘white subjects inhabit the critique, with its lengthy
duration, and to recognise the world that is re-described by the critique as
one in which they live’ (2004: §57, emphasis added). An open apology
would, therefore, accept an enduring contestation without evasion
(Diprose, 2001: 130). To share time in this context, then, would be to
remain within the untimely experience of being put into question, par-
ticularly the way the pasts, presents and futures of the dominant settler
society are interrupted in such a way that they are unpredictably
reshaped by the agency of others.
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The second element of a radical approach to coevalness would pick up
on the question of the ability of the agency of others to reshape time, and
particularly to begin to ask how recognizing this agency might not just
interrupt time but actually transform what is meant by ‘the ordinary
course of historical temporality’ referenced by Derrida. Indeed, far
from being ‘ordinary’, the conﬂation of a conception of time as for-
ward-moving with ideas of ‘progress’, which underlies notions of histor-
ical time, is more truly understood as an experience of the minority. That
is, far from being a straightforward medium that encompasses everyone,
occupying a place in ‘history’, ‘progress’, ‘the future’, indeed ‘time’ itself,
has only been available to certain kinds of persons, and even then only in
certain contexts. For the majority, including indigenous peoples, being
‘in time’, particularly ‘historical time’, is not something that is at all
‘ordinary’. What is also required, then, are the kinds of challenges
made within post-colonial theory that rework assumptions about who
needs to ‘catch up’ with whom.
This is of vital importance in the Australian context where, as
Deborah Bird Rose argues:
European ideologies of conquest assert that conquest is ﬁnished,
and that it was the product of so many compelling and inescapable
causes that it was inevitable. Ideologies throw the ball back to
Aborigines, metaphorically, telling them that they cannot live in
the past, and will just have to adapt to the new order. (1992: 197)
We have already seen evidence of this method of ‘temporal distancing’,
as Fabian has called it, in Howard’s approach to reconciliation. Finding
ways of challenging the ways time is used to bestow value and prestige on
certain groups of people at the expense of others, including approaches
such as Dipesh Chakrabarty’s emphasis on ‘provincializing modernity’
(Chakrabarty, 2000), is thus vitally important.
Indeed, there are already a wide range of indigenous strategies of ‘pro-
vincializing’ Europe and contesting its sole claim to modernity. Deborah
Bird Rose, for example, records a wealth of stories about time oﬀered by
the Yarralin people of Northern Australia, in her book Dingo Makes Us
Human (1992). In one example, she notes that Hobbles Danayarri has
argued that in fact ‘it is Europeans who are living in the past, still following
a law that has no future’ (1992: 197). While this critique may appear
strange to those privileged by the European appropriation of progress,
when seen in the context of the spectacular failure of the European dreams
of civilizing conquest, of the domination of nature, and of the free market,
the settler-descendants still holding onto these centuries-old dreams can
indeed be seen to be following laws with no future.
As Rose writes, in reference to other conversations with Danayarri,
‘failing to understand their place in the world, and the interconnectedness
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of life, Captain Cook’s successors continue to visit destruction on the
systems that support them’ (1992: 198). Writing on the diﬀerences
between Western and indigenous law, philosopher Mary Graham
makes a related critique in her discussions of the diﬀerences between
societies based on private property and those based on a ‘custodial
ethic’. She writes that indigenous philosophy ‘posits that the tendency
to possess is more deeply embedded in the human psyche than is the
tendency to share. In other words, possessiveness is a more “primitive”
mode of behaviour than sharing or altruism’ (Graham, 2008: 188). That
is, while ‘possessive behaviour is asserted or exhibited spontaneously and
unreﬂectively, sharing behaviour has to be inculcated in the ﬁrst place
and then “maintained”’ (2008: 188).
Thus, far from being the pinnacle of progress, Western law is here
presented as having a long road still to travel if it is to be one that
could support a sustainable and ethical way of life on the Australian
continent, rather than one that often only supports short-term ends
(Graham, 2008: 189). An openness to supporting the power of these
accounts to remake European settlers’ relationships with time might,
therefore, unsettle and unlock the implacable assumption that
Europeans are those at the head of the race, and thus make entrenched
methods of temporal distancing less tenable.
Finally, a third element of this approach would reach beyond the
above approaches that have, arguably, begun to develop a familiar
ring to them. That is, beyond the revaluation of the dislocating role of
the untimely, and the critiques of progress narratives, there is still the
issue of the ‘ordinariness’ of dominant Western conceptions of time. My
interest here is to suggest that the unsettling involved in a more open
sharing of time may actually have the potential to deeply transform
dominant notions of the character of social or public time itself. This
is because even while critical concepts such as ‘originary time’, ‘duration’
and the time ‘to come’ have been developed by continental philosophers
to challenge entrenched metaphysics of presence, they are nonetheless
often articulated in opposition to a ‘vulgar’, ‘public’, ‘calculable’ or
‘objective’ linear time that remains locked within traditional common-
sense accounts and which is still often understood to be the time guiding
the social.
Thus it becomes important to ask how these critiques might need to be
reworked in relation to a more sophisticated account of social time. What
would it mean to be ‘untimely’ in a context where there is no assumption
of a ‘proper’ ﬂow of linear time, but rather where the dominant social
time is understood as always a response to multiple concurrent times, as
Greenhouse suggests? That is, what is the untimely for a social time that
is, for example, linear and cyclical and intermittent depending on the
contexts and circumstances? Challenges to notions of progress could be
pressed to work even further by questioning whether assumptions about
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the future itself, as the place where solutions are to be found and thus as
that aspect which we need to be vitally concerned with, might also rest on
unexamined preconceptions. How might Rudd’s and Howard’s accounts
of reconciliation be reconﬁgured, for example, if the future were under-
stood as something that was behind us rather than in front?
To explain what I mean here I want to return to Rose’s discussions
and particularly a passage where she recounts one of the ways Yarralin
people conceptualize their orientation in time in everyday life. She writes
that this orientation is understood as follows:
. . . we here now, meaning we here in this shared present, are diﬀer-
entiated from early days people by the fact that they preceded us
and made the conditions of our existence possible. In relation to
them, we are the ‘behind mob’ – those who come after ... the future
is the domain of those who come after us. They are sometimes
referred to as the new mob, or simply as those ‘behind to we’.
(Rose, 1992: 206)
When I ﬁrst read this passage I felt both conceptually and physically
disoriented, even a bit queasy. I was so used to thinking of myself as ‘in
front’ of those who came before that the notion that those in the present
follow on ‘behind’, after their ancestors, literally made my head spin.
While this indicates, ﬁrst, how deeply ingrained (indeed, how deeply
embodied) Western accounts of time can be, it also indicates how
much more malleable time is than it might at ﬁrst seem. That is, as a
range of anthropological literature has shown, an orientation in time
towards the future is far from being universal. Even so, its apparent
self-evidence has made it a pivotal presupposition for a breath-taking
array of Western concepts. Justice, responsibility, forgiveness, politics,
agency, salvation and mourning represent just a few.
In the Australian context, then, sharing time re-makes the world in
absolutely fundamental ways. Such a realization requires, however, that
we see linear social time as not simply the time, but rather, as I discussed
above, as a method of attempting to co-opt and/or exclude diverse others.
Crucially, this does not mean that other times are therefore annihilated.
Rather, the attempt to suspend other times is never absolutely successful
(e.g. Nanni, 2011). Instead, as Mike Donaldson (1996) argues, indigenous
conceptions of time remain important tools of resistance and contestation.
A community that sought to resist the lure of a homogenizing universal
time would therefore need to ﬁnd ways of being acted upon by the agency
of these other times, and of developing ways of conceptualizing the coex-
istence of these times without seeking to homogenize them.
To learn to share time would thus also require that the metaphysics of
time that guides white settler culture is also re-described, re-worked and
re-made. Importantly, this is not a call to action but rather a call to be
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acted upon. As Rose suggests, the work that needs to be done is the work
that would put white Australians ‘in proximity to people and places
whose agency can start to remake us’ (1999: n.p.). So in exploring how
time might be thought otherwise, it is not a matter of acting to ﬁnd new
modes of living time but rather receiving the gifts of time that have
already been oﬀered (Rose, 1992: 203). The critiques mentioned above
provide contrasting orientations within time that oﬀer particular others
the gift of disorientation. Perhaps if the experience of disorientation is
given enough time it may help to produce a reorientation in the accounts
of responsibility and community that have thus far guided the Australian
political community, and understandings of political apologies more gen-
erally. Thus, in contrast to Rudd, who argued that, ‘unless we as a par-
liament set a destination for the nation, we have no clear point to guide
our policy, our programs or our purpose; we have no centralised orga-
nising principle’ (2008: n.p.), I would argue that perhaps it is precisely by
not setting a destination, but by staying with the experience of a dis-
jointed and dislocated time, that the apology Rudd sought to oﬀer on
behalf of settler Australians might have the time it needs to do its work.
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Notes
1. Here I am particularly aware of challenges to the notion of community aris-
ing in continental philosophy (e.g. Derrida, 1997; Agamben, 1993; Nancy,
1991; Blanchot, 2000). This work explicitly argues against the desire for a
unified time, whether in the present or in the future. I will return briefly to
these approaches at the end of the paper, but for the moment I want to
explore how these claims play out in the context of my case study.
2. Indeed see Ireton and Kovras (2012), who identify a sense of continuous time
as key to refusals to apologize in the context of post-colonial Cyprus.
3. A set of immigration policies that restricted non-white immigration to
Australia from Federation in 1901 into the 1970s (see Jupp, 2002).
4. The policy of transferring immigrants seeking asylum to small Pacific island
nations for processing, rather than allowing them to land on mainland
Australia. First implemented in 2001, it has been the centre of a number of
controversies around its legality and also due to the poor conditions at the
centres. See, for example, Magner (2004).
5. See in particular Jacques Derrida’s discussion of this issue in the essay ‘Ousia
and Gramm e: Note on a Note from Being and Time’ (1982).
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